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ABSTRACT 
Maritime security has become an important security focus area, due to the 
impact that piracy and terrorism have on the global economy. There are many 
studies on detecting and engaging asymmetric threats in ports and waterways. 
However, the threats are typically modeled too simply, with predefined or random 
paths and fixed responses. There is a need to model representing dynamic, 
asymmetric threat behaviors so that future threat-response models will be a more 
realistic evaluation against a dynamically adaptive foe. 
Discrete-event simulation (DES) was used to simulate a typical port-
security, local, waterside-threat response model and to test the adaptive 
response of asymmetric threats in reaction to port-security procedures, while a 
multi-agent system (MAS) was used to provide the complex adaptive behaviors 
for our threats. Cover and dynamic pathfinding were used with the sensor 
framework in Simkit to enhance the spatial interactivity of the agents. 
This study found that MAS asymmetric threats demonstrate greater 
flexibility of behaviors and show potential for adaptability. These dynamic 
asymmetric threats will enable simulation of a wider variety of maritime-threat 
scenarios, and play an important part in improving the plans for future maritime 
force and infrastructure configurations. 
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A. INTERNATIONAL MARITIME SECURITY 
In this age of global trade, millions of dollars in goods and supplies are 
being shipped across the world at any moment. Any disruption in this global 
supply chain will affect the economies of many countries. All countries in this 
global economy have a vested interest in ensuring the protection of maritime 
activities. [1] [2] 
Corresponding to the increase in trade, there is an increase in human 
activity in port areas to support the increase in shipping. With the growing 
affluence of nations, there is also an increase in leisure cruising and marina use. 
From the perspective of the would-be terrorist, these popular activities offer an 
attractive political target for achieving the objective of instilling fear into the daily 
lives of a target nation’s people. [9] 
International maritime security is essential to protect and secure these 
commercial shipping and human recreational activities in port areas and 
international waters. 
B. MARITIME ASYMMETRIC THREATS 
Asymmetric threats are thriving in the maritime environment. While lacking 
in big guns and the latest expensive modern technology for a major battle, these 
threats make use of simple equipment easily accessible in the open market, in 
conjunction with operational tactics designed to exploit the weaknesses of more 
advanced and expensive technologies. The operational tactics of the asymmetric 
threat are employed against established navies and other formal security 
establishments by terrorists, insurgent groups, and pirates. Several specific 
threats will now be described. 
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The number-one threat in most American minds is Al-Qaeda. The United 
States’ Department of Defense defines Al-Qaeda as “A radical Sunni Muslim 
umbrella organization established to recruit young Muslims into the Afghani 
mujahideen and is aimed to establish Islamist states throughout the world, 
overthrow ‘un-Islamic regimes’, expel U.S. soldiers and Western influence from 
the Gulf, and capture Jerusalem as a Muslim city” [9]. Using small suicide crafts, 
Al-Qaeda attacked the USS Cole, a destroyer-class ship, in the Yemeni port of 
Aden on October 12, 2000 [15] [16] [17] and the French tanker Limburg in the 
Gulf of Aden on October 6, 2002 [18] [19].  
Another example of a deadly threat is the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam 
(LTTE), a rebel group that has been fighting for an independent Tamil homeland 
in the north of Sri Lanka since 1976. The naval wing of the LTTE, the Sea Tigers, 
demonstrate the highest level of naval organization, tactics, technology, and 
power of any insurgent group to date, and has destroyed numerous boats, even 
a warship in the Sri Lankan navy (SLN) [13]. 
The Abu Sayyaf group (ASG) is an example of the several militant Islamist 
separatist groups fighting for an independent Islamic state in western Mindanao 
and the Sulu Archipelago, with the stated goal of creating a pan-Islamic 
superstate across southeast Asia [9]. The ASG sank the Philippine Super Ferry 
14 off Manila on February 26, 2004 [13]. 
While not part of any terrorist organization, pirate groups target 
commercial and civilian ships for robbing of cash, belongings, and navigational 
equipment, hijacking of cargoes and vessels, and kidnapping for ransom. 
Sometimes the crew is killed. [14] [12] 
C. TACTICS OF MARITIME ASYMMETRIC THREATS 
Maritime asymmetric threats employ a combination of tactics, such as fast 
speed, innocent speed, legal cover, camouflage, deception, and reducing radar 
detection signature. This study focus is on navigational tactics. It is assumed that 
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once a threat gets close to its target, it will carry out its mission successfully. The 
navigational tactics of the maritime asymmetric threats are categorized as 
follows. 
1. Outrunning 
The Sea Tigers’s fast-attack craft can chase at 40 to 45 knots, but must 
cut speed to 20 knots to fire weapons accurately [13]. 
Pirate groups in Southeast Asia have also demonstrated an ability to 
capture nonmilitary ships and escape and evade capture during the course of 
operations [13]. 
2. Maintaining Innocent Speed 
Al Qaeda used deception to get close to the USS Cole: a small boat, 
mixing with the harbor’s refueling crafts, was likely to have moved slowly without 
giving away its intent until the last moment, when it headed directly towards the 
Cole [16]. 
3. Following a Ship 
On October 23, 2000, five Sea Tigers suicide crafts followed a regular 
cargo vessel into Trincomalee harbor; two were destroyed, two escaped, and 
one reached an SLN-operated ferry, the A541. The A541 was crippled and forty 
SLN sailors injured. The successful suicide craft was aided in its final approach 
by diversionary mortar and rocket fire from a land-based LTTE unit [13]. 
4. Hiding between Ships 
On January 7, 2006, a Sea Tigers suicide craft hid inside a cluster of 
fishing vessels in Trincomalee harbor during the night and waited for an SLN 




On May 1, 2006, the Sea Tigers mounted a swarm attack just outside the 
breakwater of Trincomalee harbor, using five attack crafts to open fire on a single 
SLN Dvora patrol boat. One Sea Tigers craft was sunk, while the Dvora was 
damaged and ten SLN sailors killed. Due to command-and-control limitations, 
each group of Sea Tigers attack crafts consists of two to three crafts, but they 
can operate up to 80km apart and use speed to concentrate their forces when 
necessary [13]. 
D. APPROACH 
As part of a team performing an earlier study on “Port Security 2012” [1], a 
simulation of port-security measures was jointly developed against small-boat 
threats. The main focus was on modeling and simulation the performance of port-
security measures, including radars, thermal-vision sensors, sonars, patrol crafts, 
helicopters, unmanned surface vehicles etc. The small-boat threats were 
assigned routes randomly chosen from a table of fixed routes of attack. While 
sufficient for a broad study on the relative effectiveness of various port-security 
measures, improved fidelity in the simulation of battlefield entities was deemed 
necessary for deeper exploration of the operational tactics applicable in the 
engagement environment. 
Further study reveals that the emphasis of such extended efforts [4] [5] [6] 
[7] is typically on security measures, while simplifying the capability, and 
especially the adaptability, of asymmetric threats. Real-world incidents have 
proven different—asymmetric threats are highly agile, able to adapt their tactics 
quickly to changes in the defense infrastructure, and on the strength of such 
capability, likely to exploit any known or hitherto-unknown weakness of a defense 
infrastructure [8]. There is a need to simulate the adaptability of asymmetric 
threats, to better explore the operational tactics applicable in the engagement 
environment, and to reveal operational weaknesses that can emerge in the 
aftermath of changes to the defense infrastructure. 
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Multi-agent systems (MASs) in simulations are known for their ability to 
adapt to and explore their environment. It is hypothesized that a MAS simulation 
will provide a mechanism for simulating the adaptability of asymmetric threats 
and, in so doing, reveal operational tactics applicable in the engagement 
environment. 
Discrete-event simulation (DES) provides the foundation for this port-
security simulation. It allows for true time–space simulation and is free from the 
time truncation encountered in time-period based simulations. This is especially 
important for military simulations, in which time and spatial dimensions play 
essential roles. DES is also an event-driven simulation: loosely coupled events 
perform actions, trigger other events, and drive the simulation. Its methodology 
corresponds closely to the human concept of events and actions and allows for 
natural encoding of the human-defined rules and behaviors in a scenario.  DES 
and agent-based technology are a natural fit, because of DES’s encoding and 
application of agent rules and behaviors. 
There is a need to explore how an asymmetric threat exploits weaknesses 
in changes made to a defense infrastructure. Discrete-event simulation can 
provide a foundation for simulating defense infrastructures, while agent-based 
simulation of the threats helps explore their possible range of actions. 
It is noted that this study is only a small part of the multifaceted effort 
towards combating terrorism, which includes technological, informational, 
economical, social, and psychological approaches.  
E. OBJECTIVE AND SCOPE OF THIS STUDY 
The present objective is to identify and evaluate the adaptability of MAS 
DES asymmetric threats in defeating maritime-security procedures.  
This study asks the following questions: 
1) How can adaptable MAS asymmetric threats be encoded into DES 
models of maritime security? 
2) Does the MAS DES model demonstrate increased adaptability? 
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3) Can adaptable MAS DES models of asymmetric threats increase 
the success rate at defeating maritime-security procedures, 
compared to non-adaptable DES model of asymmetric threats? 
F. RELATED WORK 
At the Naval Postgraduate School, master’s students are exploring agent-
based technologies in maritime security and other environments. Terence Tan is 
studying the application of conceptual-blending theory to agents, for naval 
tactical-plan generation in littoral-water operation [20], and Ryan Tan is studying 
the application of agents to modeling of human behavior, in diverse areas such 
as logistic behaviors in riverine operations and social attendance [21]. 
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II. THEORY BACKGROUND 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter provides background on the DES methodology used to 
model a port-security environment, a description of MAS methodologies used in 
this study, and background on the integration of DES and MAS. The concept of 
adaptability in a simulation, and how it can be verified and validated, is also 
discussed. 
B. DES FOR PORT SECURITY 
1. DES 
Law describes DES as “modeling of a system as it evolves over time by a 
representation in which the state variables change instantaneously at separate 
points in time” [22]. These points in time are the instants at which an event 
occurs, and nothing happens in the time between them. Law says that DES can 
be implemented using next-event time advancement or fixed-increment time 
advancement, and that next-event time advancement is the approach used by all 
major simulation software. This is because fixed-increment advancement has 
well known problems of time truncation, introducing errors that affect the 
accuracy of simulation output and the ability to decide which events come first 
when simultaneous events occur. It also suffers inherently from wasted time 
increments doing nothing. 
Next-event time advancement turns the simulation clock to the time when 
the next event occurs, and in this way, applies a continuous time dimension. It 
must be noted that there are scenarios in which fixed time increments do not 
suffer from inaccuracy, incorrectness and inefficiency, but only where events 
occur at fixed times—which rarely applies in dynamic scenarios such as military 
simulations.  
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In addition to truncation of time, truncation of space can also be 
undesirable in simulations involving the spatial dimension. Depending on the 
fidelity of the scenario, its inputs, and desired results, it would be inaccurate and 
incorrect to truncate spatial values beyond the required resolution. Because the 
spatial dimension plays an important role in military simulations, truncation 
should be avoided where possible, while weighing other factors such as 
performance and resource constraints.  
DES can be described using event graphs. An event graph consists of 
event nodes and scheduling edges. The edges may be scheduled only if a 
condition is satisfied. The next event may be scheduled immediately or only after 
a specified time. The figure below shows event nodes A and B, one scheduling 
edge from A to B, one condition, i, and a scheduling time, t. [23] 
 
Figure 1 Fundamental Simulation Graph Construct. Whenever event A occurs, 
if condition i is true after A’s state transition, event B is scheduled to 
occur t time units later (From [23]) 
An event node can also cancel another previously scheduled event. This 
canceling edge is shown in the following figure as a dotted line. 
 
Figure 2 A Canceling Edge (From [23]) 
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An event node can pass attributes on edges to an event node taking in a 
parameter. As shown in the figure below, the attribute k is passed with the 
canceling edge to event node B(j). Attribute k is passed in as parameter j [24]. 
 
Figure 3 A Canceling Edge with An Attribute Passed to Event Node B (From 
[24]) 
As seen in the following figure, the changes of the state variables can also 
be depicted below the event node. 
 
Figure 4 Simulation Graph for Poisson Process (From [23]) 
Event-graph models have been shown capable of modeling any system 
that can be implemented on a computer. Thus, they can represent existing 
complex systems as well as future complex systems that might be implemented 
in other fashions. [25] 
In the context of this paper, DES is defined as using next-event time 
advance and a continuous spatial dimension and described using event graphs. 
In the real world of limited time and budgets, it is important to be able to 
know and manage the effort and resources required for a proposed simulation 
study using discrete-event simulation. Methods to measure the complexity of 
event-graph models have been introduced, including vertex count, edge-to-vertex 
ratio, cyclomatic number (number of control paths), size of event lists, and 
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combinations of these methods [26]. These can help scope, prioritize and bring 
focus to a simulation project and ensure that it is successfully executed within 
budget.  
It may be difficult to eliminate complexity completely, but complexity can 
be reduced in discrete-event simulation without reducing functionality, by 
simplifying the event graphs through various methods, including application of 
hierarchical event graphs [27], loosely coupled, component-based modeling with 
design patterns [28], and listener event-graph objects (LEGOs) [29]. 
2. Simkit 
First published in 2001 [30], Simkit is a free and open-source discrete-
event-simulation Java library made available under the GNU lesser general-
public license (LGPL) [31]. This allows Simkit to be used in proprietary programs, 
as opposed to the GNU general-public license (GPL), which requires the 
program to be offered free [33]. This proprietary accommodation is important to 
the commercial and military sectors. Simkit is used for teaching discrete-event 
simulation at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) and as the foundation library 
for Viskit, Diskit, and Gridkit, which are visual modeling, distributed interactive 
simulation (DIS), and cluster-project initiatives for discrete-event simulation at 
NPS. NPS researchers have used Simkit to create discrete-event simulations for 
army, air, navy, maritime, and other scenarios. 
Simkit implements discrete-event simulation with LEGOs, using loosely 
coupled, component-based modeling with design patterns such as listener, 
mediator, referee, and factory [34]. Present work by Koh refines the modeling 
approaches in Simkit using design patterns [32]. 
Simkit implements events, scheduling edges, a future event-list scheduler, 
cancellation of events, and parameter passing on scheduling edges to enable 
discrete-event simulation. Simkit also implements random variates, including 
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Bernoulli, binomial, exponential, geometric, normal, Poisson, uniform, Weibull 
and many others, for the application of probability distribution in the models. [30] 
Simkit uses two listener patterns, “SimEventListener” and 
“PropertyChangeListener”, to enable loosely coupled, component-based 
modeling [30]. “SimEventListener” allows for dividing a large event graph into 
components and enables loose coupling between them. 
“PropertyChangeListener” allows for the decoupling of statistics-data collection 
from events, which also simplifies the programming of event logic.  
While Simkit can be used for general programming of any type of DES 
model, it also provides a framework for simple movement and detection in 
discrete-event simulation [35]. A referee is used to compute when and where a 
target is detected by a sensor, based on the target’s movement and the sensor’s 
specifications. This schedules an event to the mediator, which decides the 
conditions under which the sensor will be notified that a target is detected. These 
sensor and movement functionalities are important for the simulation of models 
with a spatial dimension, and these basic capabilities in Simkit are a useful 
foundation for simulating the many sensors and movement platforms found in 
military command and control. This is an area where Simkit excels in comparison 
with commercially available, general-purpose DES products such as Arena [36] 
and Extend [37], etc. 
3. A* Pathfinding in Simkit 
A* search allows for efficient finding of the optimal path from a starting 
point to a destination over a graph map [38] [39]. There are many variants of the 
A* search and they are commonly used in game engines in which intelligent bots 
have to navigate their way around a map. Intelligent pathfinding is important in 
this project because it makes it possible to simulate the dynamic movement of 
small-boat threats as they respond to inputs from their environment. A* search is 
also used to enable patrol crafts to chase the small boat threats without colliding 
into the land mass. 
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Sullivan implemented an A* search in Diskit to allow pathfinding between 
the centers of rectangular zones [7]. To enhance continuity of space and allow 
dynamic movements, a higher resolution A* pathfinding map that completely 
covers the sea mass was generated to utilize the generic A* search in 
Simkit\Diskit created by Professor Arnold H. Buss. 
4. Relevant Work 
In addition to creating models for army, airforce and navy, Simkit has been 
used at NPS to create maritime scenarios. Childs’s thesis explored the creation 
of a waterfront force-protection simulation using Simkit [4]. Sullivan’s thesis 
demonstrated the application of real-world graphical and physical models to the 
waterside-security simulation using Simkit, Diskit, Viskit and Savage Studio [7]. 
The “Port Security Strategy 2012” project by the Systems Engineering and 
Analysis Cohort 11 of NPS’s Meyer Institute of Systems Engineering simulated 
multiple port-security measures, using Simkit to compare their performance in 
identifying small-boat threats. Entities simulated in the port security environment 
include a patrol helicopter, patrol crafts, radar sensors, small-boat threats, big 
ships, and small boats [1]. 
In this thesis, the DES model in “Port Security Strategy 2012” is extended 
to simulate the engagement of patrol crafts and a patrol helicopter with small-
boat threats, while interacting with the other entities in the environment. 
C. AGENTS FOR PORT SECURITY 
In their description of a taxonomy for agents, Franklin and Graessaer 
defined an autonomous agent as “a system situated within and a part of an 
environment that senses that environment and acts on it, over time, in pursuit of 
its own agenda and so as to effect what it senses in the future”. Autonomous 
agents can be characterized by the following properties: reactive, sensing and 
acting; autonomous, goal-oriented, proactive and purposeful; temporally 
continuous; communicative and socially able; able to learn and adapt; mobile; 
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and flexible in their actions and character. [43] In this study, it is hypothesized 
that agents can improve the adaptability of small-boat threats as they navigate to 
and attack a high-value zone in a port security environment. This hypothesis will 
be validated if the agents representing the small-boat threats do demonstrate a 
greater variety of navigation in attacking the high-value zone in the port-security 
environment. 
1. Multi-Agent System (MAS) 
A MAS can consist of many subagents constituting a single agent or a 
society of agents [43]. 
In a multiple-subagent system, each subagent can represent a different 
task component of a single agent, and each component is able to sense and 
react to the environment [43]. For example, a patrol craft can have one agent for 
sensing and reacting to other agents, another agent for scanning high-value 
zones, and another for performing intercepts. 
In a society of agents, multiple agents can interact and optionally 
communicate with each other [43]. For example, an agent representing a patrol 
craft can search an area for small-boat threats and broadcast detections to the 
command center. An agent representing the command center can receive 
broadcasts from multiple patrol agents and coordinate their interception of a 
small-boat threat. The agent representing the threat can maneuver to avoid 
interception while still pursuing its goal of reaching a high-value zone. 
The following diagram shows a model of an agent in a MAS. The agent 
has a mental model, an input suite taking a sensing stream from the 
environment, and an output suite taking actions that affect the environment [44].  
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Figure 5 Model of an Agent in a MAS (From [44]) 
Each agent has a set of goals, conditions, methods, and rules, as shown 
in the figure below [44]. The goals identify the agent’s objectives. The conditions 
chose which subsequent decision to carry out. The methods process the sensing 
stream into the input suite to update the weights in the mental model of the 
agent, and this affects its subsequent decision. Rules consist of rule conditions 
















Figure 6 Goals, Conditions, Methods, Rules in a MAS (From [44]) 
An MAS can be designed and implemented using the following basic 
steps [44]: 
1.  Define the MAS Model. 
A MAS can be constructed from the following model: 
MAS (multiple agent systems) = { E (Environment), A (Agents), O 
(Objects), Ops (Operations), Laws } 
i.  E (Environment) 
First, the environment the agents interact with is defined. This includes 
characteristics that provide sensory input for agents as well as characteristics 
affected by agents’ actions. 
ii.  A (Agents) 
Next, agents’ specifications are described; this can include personality, 
activity preferences, and other attributes that will influence the agent decision 
making and action.  
G1  M1 
Condition (Traffic light - go / nogo) 
Method 
G2  M2 
Gn  Mn 
…. 
 
R1 … Rn 
R1 … Rn 




iii.  O (Objects) 
Objects are the other entities in the environment that agents interact with. 
The object attributes that affect the agents’ sensory input and that are affected by 
agent actions are described. In this thesis, only agents with adaptable behavior 
are characterized as “agents” and afforded in-depth elaboration, while other 
sensing and acting entities are categorized and described as “objects.” 
iv. Ops (Operations) 
Operations are actions that can be carried out by agents and objects. The 
sequences of cause and effects are described. 
v.  Laws 
Laws are the boundary conditions that limit the agents’ scope of operation. 
Laws can include physical space, resource, and operational limitations. 
2.  Define the Experiment 
The experiment consists of the null hypothesis, the alternate hypothesis, 
and the measures to be collected for statistical analysis. The alternate hypothesis 
describes the objective of the experiment. The null hypothesis describes an 
opposite or different assumption that when refuted with statistical data can be 
used to prove the original hypothesis. [45]  
2. Relevant Work 
Harney’s thesis is an early work describing an implementation of agent-
based entities in a port-security scenario with X3D graphics [5]. Harney 
described entities that are able to move, change speed and direction, avoid 
collision, intercept, attack, and defend. Sullivan extended Harney’s work to 
design and implement agent entities in the port using DES with Simkit [7]. Oliver 
Tan’s thesis explored the use of a multi-agent system with cognitive blending for 
tracking the intentions of surface contacts in ports and waterways. Simkit was  
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used as the foundation for the discrete-event simulation of the port entities and 
the connector-based multi-agent simulation library (CMAS) was used for the 
agent implementation [6].  
These efforts focused on port security against a non-adaptive agent for 
the small-boat threat. In this thesis, enhancing the adaptability of the small-boat 
threat is a logical step in the evaluation of port-security measures. 
D. ADAPTABILITY IN BEHAVIOR 
Hu demonstrated context-dependent adaptability in crowd-control 
behavior using multi-agents in a crowd-control simulation framework [46]. The 
agents make different decisions for choosing their behaviors depending on 
behavioral context. Switching to a different context (S) in the top behavioral-
context layer modulates behavior choices in the lower behavior layer, as shown 
in the figure below. To make a behavior choice, Hu considers each behavior 
choice (b) in turn, taking the current sensory-input excitation of that choice and 
inhibiting it with the previous activation level of the other behavior choices. 
Inhibition relationships are predefined between the behaviors in the behavior 
layer, and there is a different set of inhibition relationships for behavioral context. 
Modulation achieves the behavioral-context switch by switching to the 
corresponding set of inhibition relationships. 
 
Figure 7 The Two-Layer Behavior Selection Architecture (From [46]). 
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This thesis applies similar concepts by using 
i)  a two-layer personality-action (behavioral context-behavior) 
concept, 
ii) a switch to the corresponding action set for the personality, and 
iii)  modulation to modify the probability of an action based on the 
happiness of the previous same-action choice. The probability of 
other actions in the set are reduced proportionally. The happiness 
of the previous action choice depends on how happy the last 
chosen personality is with the results. This is computed from the 
last personality choice and current sensory inputs. 
 
Figure 8 The Two-Layer Action Selection Architecture (After [46]). 
E. DESIGN AND EXPERIMENTAL APPROACH 
The adaptable MAS small-boat-threat behavior is designed using the MAS 
model and built upon the DES framework. The standard small-boat threat 
behavior uses the same DES framework and is constructed based on a flowchart 
of potential small-boat-threat tactical choices. In the next chapter, the design of 
the DES and MAS for the simulation is enlarged upon. 
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The experiment design is elaborated in Chapter IV and defines the null 
hypothesis that the MAS small-boat threat does not demonstrate adaptability, the 
alternate hypothesis that the MAS agent demonstrates adaptability, and the 
measurements for adaptability. The results are then collected and analyzed. 
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III. DESIGN OF THE MAS-DES PORT SECURITY 
A. DES DESIGN 
The DES design for the port-security simulation has four key categories: 
setup, movement, sensors, and engagement. These are described in the 
following sections. 
1.  Setup 
The following diagram shows the setup-event graph depicting the 
connections between the arrival, creator, and manager components. 
 
Figure 9 Setup-Event Graph 
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The creator components listen to the corresponding arrival components 
and creates the corresponding entities when the Arrival events are heard. The 
manager components listen to the creator components and register the entities 
for sensing and displaying when the Arrival events are heard. The creator 
components also listen to the Leave events of the mover managers and 
schedules the Leave event for the attached sensor and mover entities. The 
manager components will hear this Leave event and unregister the entities. 
2.  Movement 
The following diagram shows the movement-event graph depicting the 
connections between the mover, mover manager, and engagement components. 
 
Figure 10 Movement-Event Graph 
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The mover-manager component directs the mover component to move to 
the next waypoint and listen to the mover component’s EndMove event to know 
when the mover has arrived. The mover-manager components also listen to the 
movement-command events from the corresponding engagement components. 
For example, the small-boat-threat mover manager listens to the Attack, Hide, 
Evade, Escape and Surrender events from the small-boat-threat-engagement 
component. Similarly, the blue-entity-patrol mover manager (BEPMM) listens to 
the Intercept and StopIntercept event from the blue-entity-engagement 
component. The neutral-craft mover manager does not listen to any engagement 
component and simply directs its mover to go along the specified path. 
The BEPMM extends the PatrolMoverManager and provides intercept 
behavior in addition to patrol behavior. When intercept is activated, the BEPMM 
stops patrolling behavior and runs intercept behavior. When intercept is called 
off, the BEPMM resumes patrol behavior. 
The small-boat-threat mover manager (SBTMM) extends the 
PathMoverManager and uses the path-movement behavior to provide attack, 
following, evasion, escape, and surrender behavior. When the small-boat threat 
has reached the destination for attack or escape, or when it has surrendered, it 
will schedule the Leave event to initiate removing the threat from the simulation. 
3.  Sensor 
The following diagram shows the blue-entity flowchart for small-boat-threat 
detection and engagement procedures. As can be seen, the detection process 
follows the detect→classify→recognize→identify cycle. The detected entity is 




Figure 11 Blue-Entity Flowchart for Small-Boat-Threat Detection and 
Engagement 
The following diagram shows the blue-entity sensor-event graph depicting 
the connections between the sensor manager, the sensor referees, the sensor 
mediator, the blue-entities sensors, the movers, and the blue-entity command 
center. In the setup-event graph, the sensor manager listens to the Arrival and 
Leave events and notifies the referees to register and unregister the specified 
entities. The sensor manager also registers the mediators in the Mediator 
framework for all combinations of sensors and movers in the simulation. 
The referees listen to the movementState properties of the registered 
sensors and movers and computes the time delay for subsequent EnterRange 
and ExitRange events. When the mediator hears the EnterRange or ExitRange 
events, it checks whether the sensed entity is hidden by another entity, and 
schedules the Detection and Undetection events in the detecting sensor if not. 
 25 
 
Figure 12 Blue-Entity Sensor Event Graph 
The blue-entity sensor implements the detect→classify→ 
recognize→identify cycle. In addition, it tracks the velocity change of the target 
and whether it has entered a high-value zone. It does so by listening to the 
velocity property change of the target and by listening to EnterHighValueZone 
and ExitHighValueZone events of the high-value zone. The high-value zone is a 
stationary sensor and informs listening entities when a target enters its sensing 
radius. 
The blue-entity intercept zone is a mobile sensor that attaches itself to the 
same mover platform as the blue-entity sensor. The blue-entity sensor listens to 
the blue-entity intercept zone to know when a target has entered its intercept 
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radius, which is different from its sensor radius. Finally, the blue-entity sensor 
sends SendBroadcast events to the listening blue-entity command center to 
inform it of these detections, and the command center will assign target 
interception to whichever blue entity can get there fastest. 
The following diagram shows the small-boat-threat flowchart for blue-entity 
threat detection and engagement procedures. Like the blue entity, the small-boat 
threat also follows the detect→classify→recognize→identify cycle, but is able to 
identify the patrol on completion of the recognized phase. The small-boat threat 
is also able to track the speed of the target to identify the blue entity. 
 
Figure 13 Small-Boat Threat Flowchart for Blue-Entity Detection and 
Engagement 
The following diagram shows the small-boat-threat sensor-event graph 
depicting the connections between the sensor referees, the sensor mediator, the 
small-boat-threat sensor, the movers, and the port-cover sensor. 
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Figure 14 Small-Boat-Threat Sensor-Event Graph 
The following diagram shows the flowchart for the integrated sensor and 
cover-detection process. Each detectable entity can enter into four states: 
i)  within sensor range and cover range, 
ii)  within sensor range and outside cover range, 
iii)  outside sensor range and within cover range, and 
iv)  outside sensor range and cover range. 
In the first state, the entity is visible to the sensor, while the in the other 
three states, the entity is hidden. 
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Figure 15 Flowchart for the Integrated Sensor and Cover-Detection Process 
The following diagram shows a simplified view of the cover mediator 
working jointly with the normal sensor and cover sensor to decide whether to 
inform the sensor that it has detected an entity. Refer to Appendix B:  Code 
Snippets for sample implementation code. 
 
Figure 16 Simplified View of Cover Design with Cover Mediator and Cover 
Referee 
When the mediator hears the EnterRange event, it checks whether the 
event is to signal one entity covering the other; it does this by checking whether 
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the sensor is a cover sensor, and if so, checks their relative radar cross section 
to decide which entity provides the cover. If both have the same relative radar 
cross section, the current sensor is chosen to provide the cover. When the 
mediator hears the ExitRange event for a cover sensor, it checks and removes 
any cover that is provided between the entities. 
The following is a sample scenario of cover provided by an entity with a 
larger relative radar cross section. 
 
Figure 17 Providing Cover with Relative Radar Cross Sections 
The small-boat-threat sensor sends Broadcast events of these detections 
to its engagement component, and this provides the necessary sensory input to 
the engagement component. 
 30 
4.  Engagement 
As shown in Figure 11, the blue entity will continue to move towards the 
small-boat threat to apply nonlethal or lethal force until the threat is neutralized. 
As shown in Figure 13, the threat will surrender when the blue entity applies 
force, whether lethal or nonlethal. Otherwise, the threat will run the standard or 
MAS behavior to choose between attacking, hiding, evading, and escaping. 
The following diagram shows the engagement-event graph depicting the 
connections between the mover-manager, engagement, intercept-zone, and 
command-center components. 
 
Figure 18 Engagement-Event Graph 
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The patrol-engagement component listens to command broadcasts from 
the blue-entity command center to intercept or stop intercept of a target. It 
notifies its mover-manager component to carry out these actions. When the 
target has entered its intercept zone, the patrol-engagement component hears 
the EnterInterceptRange event and takes non-lethal or lethal action on the target. 
The small-boat threat engagement component hears these Non-lethal and Lethal 
events and immediately schedules the Surrender event. The patrol-engagement 
component listens for the small-boat threat’s actions and informs the command 
center whether the small-boat threat is neutralized or active. 
The small-boat-threat-engagement component listens for sensor 
broadcast events from its sensor component and runs the standard or MAS 
behavior to select and schedule the appropriate action event, including Attack, 
Hide, Evade or Escape. This is picked up by the listening mover-manager 
component, which carries out the corresponding movements. 
B. MAS DESIGN 
The small-boat threat MAS model is defined as 
Small-boat threat MAS Model =  
{ 
E (Port of Oakland),  
A (Small-boat threats),  
O (Patrol crafts and helicopters, radar, big ships, small boats, high-value 
zones),  
Ops (Sensing, navigation, small-boat threat activities, blue-entity activities, 
results of activities), 




The following diagram shows an overview of the small-boat threat MAS 
model. 
 
Figure 19 Overview of Small-Boat Threat MAS 
The follow sections describe the environment, agents, objects, operations 
and laws of the small-boat threat MAS model in more detail. 
1. Environment 
a. Port of Oakland 
The Port of Oakland environment in “Port Security 2012” [1] was 
used as the starting point for this thesis. The sea area in the Port of Oakland 
defines the sea entities’ area of movement. A pathfinding map covering this area 
is required for mobile agents, especially the patrol helicopter, patrol crafts, and 
small-boat threats. As “Port Security 2012” uses only fixed paths, there is a need 
to generate this pathfinding map in this thesis. 
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Figure 20 Oakland Satellite-Imagery Map from Google Map 
b. Automated Generation of Pathfinding Map of Port of 
Oakland 
An automatic map-generation process for creating an A* 
pathfinding map was designed and implemented in this project. This A* 
pathfinding map defines sea locations that vessels can navigate to and enables 
the A* search to find the path. Manually defining this pathfinding map would be 
tedious; instead, automatic map generation computes the map from shoreline 
data downloaded from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
(NOAA) public website [38]. The result is an eight-connected grid map of the Port 
of Oakland. Snapshots of the process are shown in the figures below. 
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Figure 21 NOAA Oakland Shoreline Vector Map 
 
Figure 22 Grid Cell Map Generated from Shoreline Vector Map (Shown with 
Shoreline Vector Map) 
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Figure 23 Eight-Connected Graph Generated from Grid Cell Map (Shown with 
Grid Cell Map and Shoreline Vector Map) 
A grid-cell map representation as described by Tozour [41] is first 
generated from the Oakland shoreline vector map. An eight-connected graph is 
then generated from the grid-cell map. The eight-connected graph is chosen over 
the four-connected graph because it improves A* performance with the more 
direct route available to the destination. The automated search space 
representation consists of the following key steps: 
1)  Separation of land and sea mass through creation of land mass 
polygons using NOAA shoreline vector map. 
2)  Map scaling and positioning of Port of Oakland satellite raster map 
and shoreline vector maps using simple map processing. 
3)  Computation of grid map through land-mass check of shoreline 
vector map. Land mass is defined as obstacle grid cells in the grid 
map. 
4)  Computation of network graph through creation of nodes and edges 
based on non-obstacle grid cells in the grid map. 
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c. Dynamic Movement of Sea Entities in the Port of 
Oakland 
Sea entities are able to move dynamically and without collision into 
the land mass in the Port of Oakland by using the following algorithm:  
(1) Finding Nearest Waypoints to Starting and Ending 
Points.  The nearest grid cells in the pathfinding map to the starting and ending 
points are first located. An algorithm is designed and implemented to take the 
input points to search the current grid cells and neighboring grid cells for non-
obstacle grid cells. This finds the non-obstacle starting and ending grid cells that 
is required for the A* pathfinding search to be able to find a valid path. This is 
shown in the diagram below. The algorithm searches the current grid cell, 
followed by the nearest left, right, bottom or top grid cells, followed by the 
diagonal grid cells, and then, finally, clockwise from the bottom cell. 
 
 
 (a) (b) 
Figure 24 Finding Nearest Waypoint to Starting and Ending Points: (a) Grid cell 




(2) Finding a Near-Optimal Path with A* Pathfinding 
Algorithm.  The A* pathfinding algorithm in Simkit\Diskit is applied to the 
generated pathfinding map and tested in this thesis. This computes a path 
through the centers of the non-obstacle grid cells in the pathfinding map. 
(3) Connection of Starting and Ending Points.  The 
starting and ending points are appended to the ends of the A* path, to complete 
the path from the starting point, through the pathfinding map, and to the ending 
point. 
(4) Path Smoothing.  The resulting path consists of a 
large number of points, many of them unnecessary in the Port of Oakland 
scenario, which consists of large sea masses. Path smoothing is performed as a 
post-processing step to remove unnecessary points. A straightforward path 
smoothing described by Pinter is implemented and modified [42]. Pinter’s 
algorithm checks whether intermediate waypoints can be removed without having 
the path crossing the blocked grid cell. This is shown in the diagram below. The 
black polygon represents the shoreline obstacle and the light gray squares are 
the corresponding blocked grid cells. Note that Pinter’s algorithm reduces the 
number of waypoints returned by the A* pathfinding algorithm while avoiding the 
blocked grid cells. 
 
 (a) (b) (c) 
Figure 25 Pinter’s Path Smoothing: (a) Typical A* path with many waypoints; 
(b) Check for smoothing against blocked grid cells (gray); (c) Final 
path with intermediate waypoints removed 
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The pseudo-code for Pinter’s algorithm is shown below. 
checkPoint = starting point of path 
currentPoint = next point in path 
while (currentPoint→next != NULL) 
if CanSmoothSegment(checkPoint, currentPoint→next) 
// Remove intermediate points to 
// make a straight path between those points: 
temp = currentPoint 
currentPoint = currentPoint→next 
delete temp from the path 
else 
checkPoint = currentPoint 
currentPoint = currentPoint→next 
In this thesis, the “CanSmoothSegment” function is modified 
from Pinter’s algorithm to consider the finer-resolution shoreline obstacle. This is 
shown in the diagram below. This precise algorithm reduces the number of 
waypoints returned by the A* pathfinding algorithm while avoiding the shoreline, 
but the computation takes a long time, because the checks for each line segment 




 (a) (b) (c) 
Figure 26 Precise Smoothing: (a) Typical A* path with many waypoints; (b) 
Checks for smoothing against shoreline (black); (c) Final path with 
intermediate waypoints removed 
A basic obstacle-checking algorithm is chosen over a more precise 
one for better performance in the path-smoothing algorithm. This basic obstacle-
checking algorithm inspects shoreline intersections with segment bounds, 
allowing smoothing against the shoreline while maintaining acceptable 
performance. 
 
 (a) (b) (c) 
Figure 27 Basic Smoothing: (a) Checks of segment bounds against shoreline; 
(b) Bounds of non-intersecting segments; (c) Final path with 
intermediate waypoints removed 
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2. Agents 
a. Small-Boat Threat Attributes 
The small-boat threat has four navigation modes, or actions, that 
the small-boat threat can take in response to sensory inputs: attack, hide, evade, 
and escape. Two small-boat threats start their attack during the first attack wave, 
and two others start during the second wave, five minutes later. The threat 
travels at full speed during the attack and can reduce speed for hiding and 
following its cover target. The small-boat threat is assigned a relatively low radar 
cross section, as this is identified as a potential detection-reducing tactic. 
Table 1 Small-Boat Threat Attributes 



















●Initial - 2 small-
boat threats start 
attack in first wave, 
2 small boats start 
attack in second 
wave 5 minutes later 
●Attack - move at 
maximum speed to 
attack target with 
dynamic pathfinding 
●Hide - move at 
maximum speed to 
nearest cover and 
follow cover 
movement and 
speed with dynamic 
pathfinding 
●Evade - move at 




entity with dynamic 
pathfinding 
●Escape - move at 
maximum speed to 








b. Small-Boat Threat Personality 
Four personalities are potentially in play: the suicidal, tactical, 
deceptive, and balanced. The personalities accept sensory inputs to the 
personality layer to compute the happiness of the last decision and predict the 
happiness of the next. These happiness values are used to modulate the action 
weights and switch to the personality action weights for the next decision, as 
shown in the diagram below. 
 
Figure 28 Personality and Action Selection 
The sensory inputs to the personality layer are distance to the 
attack target, nearest blue entity, and nearest cover. Happiness is a function of 
the changes in these distances and their corresponding personality motivation 
weights. Happiness is computed as follows: 
Happiness =  
(+ve normalized reduction in distance to attack target) * motivation 
for attack +  
(+ve normalized increase in distance to nearest blue entity) * 
motivation for tactical +  
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(+ve normalized reduction in distance to nearest cover) * motivation 
for deception. 
Normalization of the distances uses the maximum distance for each 
case, for example, the maximum distance to the target is from the starting 
location, and the maximum distance to the nearest blue entity and nearest cover 
is the maximum sensor range of the small-boat threat. 
The following table lists the small-boat threat personality matrix. 
The values remain fixed throughout the simulation. 























Suicide 1.0 0.0 0.0 
Tactical 0.0 1.0 0.0 
Deceptive 0.0 0.0 1.0 
Balanced 0.3 0.3 0.3 
 
The following table lists the initial small-boat-threat action matrix. 
The weights in the action matrix are modified by the last happiness result. A 
positive happiness for an action increases its weightage and increases the 
probability that this action will be selected in subsequent decisions. 














Suicide 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 
Tactical 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 
Deceptive 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 




The action matrix is updated using the following steps: 
i)  Half the value of the last happiness is added to the last chosen 
action of the last chosen personality. 
ii)  The remaining half of the happiness is divided equally between the 
remaining actions of this last chosen personality. 
iii)  The action weights of this last chosen personality are normalized so 
that they sum to one. 
The pseudo-code for updating the action matrix is as follows: 
Action[last personality][last action] = (Action[last personality][last 
action] + 0.5 * happiness) / (1.0 + happiness) 
Action[last personality][other actions] = (Action[last personality][last 
action] + 0.5 * happiness / 3) / (1.0 + happiness) 
There is no update for Action[other personalities][any action]. 
The action distribution for choosing the next action are computed 
thus: 
Action Distribution { attack, hide, evade, escape } =  
{ 
< Action[next chosen personality][attack], 
< Action[next chosen personality][attack] + Action[next chosen 
personality][hide], 
< Action[next chosen personality][attack] + Action[next chosen 
personality][hide] + Action[next chosen personality][evade], 
< 1.0 
} 
The next action is chosen by selecting the action where the 
random-variate value falls under the action-weight distribution. This is subject to 
the rule conditions affected by the sensory inputs. Refer to Appendix B:  Code 
Snippets, for implementation code. 
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c. Small-Boat Threat Goals, Conditions, Methods, Rules 
The sensory inputs to the action layer are attack-target position, 
nearby blue-entity position and velocity, and nearby cover position and velocity. 
These inputs determine whether an action can be carried out, and how it is 
carried out physically in the Port of Oakland environment. The following table lists 
the small-boat threat goals, conditions, methods, and rules. 
Table 4 Small-Boat Threat Goals, Conditions, Methods, and Rules 
Goals Conditions Methods Rules 






























1. Compute happiness for last chosen 
personality 
- Happiness = (+ve normalized 
reduction in distance to attack target) * 
motivation for attack + 
(+ve normalized increase in distance to 
nearest blue entity) * motivation for 
tactical + (+ve normalized reduction in 
distance to nearest cover) * motivation 
for deception 
- normalization based on maximum 
distance from start location to target, or 
maximum sensor range 
2. Update and normalize last chosen 
action weight for last chosen personality 
based on happiness 
- Add half happiness to last chosen 
action weight of last chosen personality 
- Distribute remaining happiness to 
other action weights of last chosen 
personality 
- Normalize action weights of 
personality 












To decide which action is carried out, the personality with the most 
happiness is chosen first. The action weights for decision making are switched to 
this personality’s action set. A random variate is generated to select the action in 
this action set. If the action selected by the random variate does not satisfy the 
rule conditions, the next action is chosen and its rule-conditions are checked. 
This continues until a valid action is found. If no valid action is found, the default 
action is chosen. This default action is attack. 
A sample decision scenario is presented below. 
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In the initial condition,  
i)  normalizing distance to attack target = distance from starting point 
to attack target = assuming 100km, 
ii)  normalizing distance to nearby blue entity = maximum sensor range 
= 1km, 
iii)  normalizing distance to nearby cover = maximum sensor range = 
1km, 
Assuming that in the current decision event, 
i)  reduction in distance from attack target is 10km, 
ii) increase in distance to nearest blue-entity location is 0.05km, 
iii)  reduction in distance to nearest cover is 0.01km, 
iv)  last chosen personality is suicide, and 
v)  last chosen action is attack, 
vi)  last updated action weights values for suicide personality are [0.26, 
0.249, 0.246, 0.245]. 
Happiness for suicide personality = ($10km / 100km) * 1.0 + 
(0.05km / 1km) * 0.0 + (0.01km / 1km) * 0.0 = 0.1 
Happiness for tactical personality = ($10km / 100km) * 0.0 + 
(0.05km / 1km) * 1.0 + (0.01km / 1km) * 0.0 = 0.05  
Happiness for deceptive personality = ($10km / 100km) * 0.0 + 
(0.05km / 1km) * 0.0 + (0.01km / 1km) * 1.0 = 0.01 
Happiness for balanced personality = ($10km / 100km) * 0.3 + 
(0.05km / 1km) * 0.3 + (0.01km / 1km) * 0.3 = 0.03 + 0.015 + 0.003 = 0.0453 
Thus, happiness for last personality (suicide) is 0.1. Chosen 
personality is also suicide as it has the largest happiness value. 
The action matrix is updated as follows: 
Action[suicide][attack] = (0.26 + 0.5 * 0.1) / (1 + 0.1) ~= 0.282 
Action[suicide][hide] = (0.249 + 0.5 * 0.1 / 3) / (1 + 0.1) ~= 0.242 
Action[suicide][evade] = (0.246 + 0.5 * 0.1 / 3) / (1 + 0.1) ~=0.239 
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Action[suicide][escape] = (0.245 + 0.5 * 0.1 / 3) / (1 + 0.1) ~= 0.298 
The other values in the action matrix are unchanged. 
This gives the following action distribution for the next chosen 
personality (suicide): Action Distribution { <0.282, < (0.282 + 0.242), < (0.282 + 
0.242 + 0.239), <1.0} = Action Distribution { <0.282, <0.524, <0.763, <1.0 } 
Assuming the random variate for the action choice generates a 
value of 0.123, this corresponds to choosing the attack action for the next 
behavior. Alternatively, assuming the random variate for the action choice 
generates a value of 0.345, this corresponds to choosing the hide action for the 
next behavior. This invokes the rule condition, which checks whether there is 
cover nearby. If there is cover nearby, hiding is chosen. Otherwise, the next 
action (evade) is considered and this also invokes the rule condition that there 
must be a blue entity nearby to evade. It there is a blue entity nearby, evasion is 
chosen. If not, the next action (escape) is considered and again, this invokes the 
rule condition that there must be a blue entity nearby to evade. It there is blue 
entity nearby, escape is chosen. If not, the default action (attack) is chosen. 
d. Small-Boat Threat MAS Behavior 
The following flowchart shows how the small-boat threat MAS 
behavior performs a personality and action selection, after which the selected 




Figure 29 Small-Boat Threat: MAS Behavior Flowchart 
e. Small-Boat Threat Standard Behavior 
The same environment, objects, operations and laws are used by 
the small-boat threat standard behavior, and only the behavior is different from 
the threat MAS behavior. The flowchart below is the design for the standard 
behavior of the small-boat threat and is implemented using DES. It uses a few 
more rules, such as whether it is chased, can hit the target first, or can outrun the 
target, and the decision choice is made using this fixed sequence of rules. 
 48 
 
Figure 30 Small-Boat Threat: Standard Behavior Flowchart 
3. Objects 
The blue entities consist of one patrol helicopter, four patrol crafts, one 
stationary radar, and three high-value zones. The neutral crafts comprise a few 
big ships and many small boats. The neutral crafts move on fixed randomly 
selected paths around the Port of Oakland. The patrol helicopter and crafts also 
move on fixed patrol paths, and in addition, they are able to intercept the small-
boat threats by using dynamic pathfinding to find new paths. All the blue entities 
are able to sense both neutral crafts and threats. The neutral crafts do not have 
sensing capabilities. The patrol helicopter and crafts also have a sensor to detect 
whether the threats have entered the intercept range. Big ships have a very large 
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relative radar cross section compared to small boats. The small boats, in turn, 
have a larger relative radar cross section than the small-boat threats. The 
following table lists the objects attributes. 
Table 5 Objects Attributes 
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4. Operations 
The operations in the small-boat threat MAS model consist of sensing, 
navigation, small-boat-threat activities, blue-entities activities, and results of 
activities. 
a. Sensing 
Blue entities and small-boat threats identify a known threat through 
the detection→classified→recognised→identified cycle. Each phase in the cycle 
takes three minutes. The blue entities have a 20% chance of detecting arms and 
marking the target as a known threat in the recognised phase. Identification of 
the small-boat threats is assured when the identified phase is completed. The 
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threats identify the blue entities earlier and this occurs on completion of the 
recognized phase. The cycle is terminated when the target exits the sensing 
range. The cycle is restarted when the target re-enters the sensing range. 
A blue entity can only sense whether a neutral craft or small-boat 
threat enters or exits a high-value zone if the entity is within the blue-entity’s 
sensing radius. A blue entity can only sense whether a small-boat threat has 
entered the blue entity’s intercept zone if it has been commanded to intercept the 
target. 
Blue entities and small-boat threats start tracking the velocity of an 
unknown threat when it is first detected. If the velocity exceeds the legal limit, the 
target is marked as a known threat. Note that when the patrol craft is cruising 
during its patrol round, its velocity is within the legal limit and is not immediately 
marked as a threat because of this. 
Neutral crafts, such as big ships and small boats, and small-boat 
threats are deemed to be within cover when they are less than 5m apart. In 
cover, the craft with the largest radar cross section is detected while the other 
crafts are lost. If crafts have the same radar cross section, the first cover 
detecting the other entity is chosen to be detected while the others are hidden. 
b. Navigation 
The movement of all entities uses uniform linear velocity without 
acceleration, and this is subject to the maximum speed specified for the entity. 
Navigation within the Port of Oakland’s generated-pathfinding map 
results in navigation to any point within the sea mass, and there is no movement 
onto land. 
To reduce complexity in implementation, the patrol helicopter also 
uses the same navigation map for its dynamic pathfinding. Thus, for interception, 
the patrol helicopter will move over the sea mass only, skirting any coasts that 
may obtrude. 
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c. Small-Boat-Threat Activities 
(1) Attacking.  Small-boat threats start with attack activity 
and move at maximum speed to hit their targets. 
(2) Hiding.  The small-boat threats’ hiding means finding, 
moving to, and following the nearest cover with a large relative radar cross 
section. 
(3) Evasion.  Evasion can only result from the near 
proximity of a blue entity, and results in the small-boat threat’s moving generally 
opposite the direction of the blue entity, at maximum speed. 
(4) Escape.  Escape can only result from the near 
proximity of a blue entity, and results in the small-boat threat’s returning to its 
starting location at top speed. 
d. Blue-Entity Activities 
(1) Intercept and Stop Intercept.  Blue entities broadcast 
significant detections to the blue-entity command center. The command center 
identifies the blue entity that can engage the target quickest and commands it to 
intercept. 
The blue-entity command center has a priority list of 
unassigned targets, from known-threats detection to unknown threats in high-
value zones, to known threats in high-value zones (which have highest priority). 
The blue entity broadcasts the surrender of small-boat 
threats to the command center. The command center calls off the intercept, and 
the blue entity resumes patrol. 
When the blue entity loses sight of a threat, it broadcasts to 
inform the command center. If no blue entity can see the threat, the command 
center calls off any intercepting blue entity. 
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(2) Non-Lethal or Lethal.  A blue entity applies non-lethal 
or lethal action on a small-boat threat immediately, once it is within intercept 
range. 
e. Results of Activities 
(1) Surrender.  The small-boat threat immediately 
surrenders upon non-lethal or lethal action by helicopter or patrol craft. 
(2) Successful Attack.  The small-boat threat’s attack is 
deemed successful when it reaches its attack target. 
(3) Successful Escape.  The small-boat threat’s escape is 
deemed successful when it returns to its starting location. 
(4) Leaving the Simulation.  Neutral crafts leave the 
simulation on arriving at their destinations and small-boat threats leave the 
simulation upon a successful attack, escape, or surrender. This prevents false 
detections of neutral crafts and nonexistent small-boat threats. 
Blue entities do not leave the scenario; they continue to 
monitor and patrol the port. 
5. Laws 
a. Two-Dimensional World 
Both sensing and navigation are performed in a two-dimensional 
world. 
b. Sensor Laws 
Both blue entities and small-boat threats can sense multiple targets 
simultaneously. 
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The legal speed limit in port waters is 30 knots, and any entity 
traveling faster, such as the small-boat threat, is marked by tracking sensors as a 
threat. 
c. Movement Laws 
Entities will not collide with the land mass; however, multiple 
entities are allowed to be at the same location in the sea area, as they are 
assumed likely to reposition themselves to avoid collisions. 
d. Activities Laws 
A blue entity can intercept only one small-boat threat at a time and 
is meanwhile unavailable for other assignments. The assignment of the attack 
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IV. EXPERIMENT, RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
A. EXPERIMENT 
1.  Hypothesis and Measurements 
The null hypothesis is that there is no statistically significant change in the 
adaptability of the MAS compared to the standard behavior. 
The alternate hypothesis is that applying a two-layer, personality-action 
MAS to small-boat threats increases their adaptability, as compared to a 
standard implementation. 
The parametric t-Test with unequal variances, and the non-parametric 
Wilcoxon/Kruskal-Wallis (Rank Sums) test was applied, with two-tail probability, 
using JMP 7 software. As the measurements are dependent, significance 
remains indicated by an Alpha of 0.05. 
Adaptability was measured in the following ways: 
i)  increase in complexity of operations 
This measure was collected from the sub-measures of 
a.  increase in length of operation time 
Null Hypothesis NH1_1: There is no significant change in 
operation time. 
Operation TimeStandard = Operation TimeMAS 
Alternate Hypothesis AH1_1: There is significant change in 
operation time. 
b.  increase in number of operations. 
Null Hypothesis NH1_2: There is no significant change in 
number of operations. 
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Number of OperationsStandard = Number of OperationsMAS 
Alternate Hypothesis AH1_2: There is significant change in 
number of operations. 
ii)  increase in flexibility of operations 
This measure corresponds to an increase in the distribution of actions. 
This measure was collected from the sub-measures of 
a.  Attack Activity Count 
Null Hypothesis NH2_1: There is no significant change in the 
attack activity count. 
Attack Activity CountStandard = Attack Activity CountMAS 
Alternate Hypothesis AH2_1: There is significant change in 
the attack activity count. 
b.  Hide Activity Count 
Null Hypothesis NH2_2: There is no significant change in the 
hide activity count. 
Hide Activity CountStandard = Hide Activity CountMAS 
Alternate Hypothesis AH2_2: There is significant change in 
the hide activity count. 
c.  Evade Activity Count 
Null Hypothesis NH2_3: There is no significant change in the 
evade activity count. 
Evade Activity CountStandard = Evade Activity CountMAS 
Alternate Hypothesis AH2_3: There is significant change in 
the evade activity count. 
d.  Escape Activity Count 
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Null Hypothesis NH2_4: There is no significant change in the 
escape activity count. 
Escape Activity CountStandard = Escape Activity CountMAS 
Alternate Hypothesis AH2_4: There is significant change in 
the escape activity count. 
iii)  increase in success of operations 
This measure corresponds to an increase in successful attacks by the 
small-boat threats. 
Null Hypothesis NH3: There is no significant change in the attack success 
count.  
Attack Success CountStandard = Attack Success CountMAS 
Alternate Hypothesis AH3: There is significant change in the attack 
success count. 
2.  Experimental Setup 




Figure 31 Screen Capture of Simulation Application 
The simulation was executed with thirty runs using standard behavior. The 
simulation was then executed with thirty runs using MAS behavior. 
The following data was collected for each run: 
i)  operation time 
The time from first arrival to completion of attack by four small-boat 
threats. 
ii)  number of activities per simulation run 
The total number of activities executed by the four threats per simulation 
run. 
iii)  attack-activity count 
The total number of attack activities executed by the four threats per 
simulation run. 
 59 
iv)  hide-activity count 
The total number of hides executed by the four small-boat threats per 
simulation run. 
v)  evade-activity count 
The total number of evade activities executed by the four small-boat 
threats per simulation run. 
vi)  escape-activity count 
The total number of escape activities executed by the four small-boat 
threats per simulation run. 
vii)  attack-success count 
The total number of successful attacks by the four small-boat threats per 
simulation run. 
The following picture shows a screen snapshot of the measurement data 
output by the simulation application. 
 
Figure 32 Screen Snapshot of Measurement Data Output by Simulation 
Application 
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The following picture shows a screen snapshot of the MAS data output by 
the simulation application. Note that the some of the action weights are modified 
during the course of the simulation. 
 
Figure 33 Screen Snapshot of MAS Data Output by Simulation Application 
B. RESULTS 
The following statistical results are compiled from the collected 
measurements. Refer to Appendix A:  Results of Measurements and Statistical 
Results for details. 
Table 6 Summary of Statistical Results 





















Std Mean 12.93434 16.96667 14.5 0.133333 2.333333 0 2.166667
  Standard Deviation 2.479213 7.289498 6.112452 0.571346 2.264164 0 0.791478
MAS Mean 13.04888 17.53333 8.066667 0.566667 5.5 3.4 2.466667
  Standard Deviation 2.348321 8.985557 2.899861 1.406471 4.040741 2.823546 0.937102
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Change in Mean 
from Std to MAS 0.11 0.57 -6.43 0.43 3.17 3.40 0.30 
  
t Test with 
Unequal 
Variances, Prob > 





Sums), Prob > |Z| 0.8882 0.7839 <0.0001 0.1268 0.0003<0.0001 0.2444
C. ANALYSIS 
1. Assessment of Complexity of Operations 
The null hypotheses NH1_1 “There is no significant change in operation 
time” and NH1_2 “There is no significant change in number of operations” failed 
to be rejected. Thus, there is no statistical significance that MAS behavior 
increased operation time and total activity count. 
2. Assessment of Flexibility of Operations 
The null hypotheses NH2_1 “There is no significant change in the attack 
activity count”, NH2_3 “There is no significant change in the evade activity count” 
and NH2_4 “There is no significant change in the escape activity count” are 
rejected. The null hypothesis NH2_2 “There is no significant change in the hide 
activity count” failed to be rejected. 
As the figures are related and there is a greater distribution of activity to 
evade and escape activities, it is concluded that there is statistical significance 
that MAS behavior increased utility of a variety of operations. 
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3. Assessment of Success of Operations 
The null hypothesis NH2_1 “There is no significant change in the attack 
success count” failed to be rejected. There is no statistical significance that MAS 
behavior increased success of operations. 
4. Observed Artifacts 
There are zero cases of successful escapes, although there are recorded 
attempts of escape activity made by the threats. 
5. Assessment of Whether MAS Behavior Improved Adaptability 
of Small-Boat Threats 
There is statistical significance that the implemented MAS behavior 
increased the flexibility of operations, but there is no statistical significance that 
the implemented MAS behavior increased the complexity of the operations and 
the success of operations. 
Reviewing the summary of results reveals that there are increases in the 
mean for the measurements for the complexity of operation and the success of 
operations. These increases are relatively small for both measurements for 
complexity of operations, but larger for success of operations. In the latter case, 
there is a favorable chance that the implemented MAS behavior improved the 
complexity of operations and especially the success of operations. 
It can thus be concluded that MAS behavior demonstrates improvement of 




V. CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND FUTURE 
WORK 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
Discrete-event simulation with Simkit facilitated the creation of 
autonomous and interactive sensing agents in a maritime time–space 
environment. Dynamic pathfinding improved the flexibility of dynamic asymmetric 
threats and maritime assets in finding their way to their targets. With the 
implementation of MAS behavior, asymmetric threats demonstrate greater 
flexibility of behaviors, show slight improvement in success and complexity of 
operations, and evince potential for improving adaptability. In maritime security, 
dynamic asymmetric threats will enable the simulation of a wider variety of 
maritime threat scenarios and play an important part in improving plans for 
maritime force and infrastructure configurations. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
MAS behaviors can be used to enhance hard-coded behaviors in 
simulations by assigning them with personalities, decisions, and action choices. 
While still conforming to the rules and boundaries of the environment, these MAS 
behaviors enable the agents to interact with the environment in a dynamic and 
flexible manner. The agents have more free play to explore the environment with 
flexible behaviors, and the variety of potential situations in the simulation will 
increase, expanding simulation exploration into previously uncharted waters and 
increasing their value. 
MAS behaviors enable agents to switch personality contexts according to 
situation, allowing them to choose appropriate actions. With adaptability, agents 




survivability, and success in achieving operational goals. Dynamic asymmetric 
threats will pose a more potent threat in simulations and facilitate wider 
explorations of force- and defense-infrastructure configurations. 
C. FUTURE WORK 
Potential future work includes: 
i)  Study interactions and refine maritime scenarios with stakeholders 
to identify potential tactics and improvements in maritime-defense 
infrastructure, 
ii)  Explore application of the genetic algorithm to the natural evolution 
of personality genes, to improve chances of successful attack, 
iii)  Explore the application of cognitive blending to blend inputs and 
improve decision making, 
iv)  Explore application of MAS behavior to blue entities and the 
affected changes in interaction between the agents, 
v)  Explore changes in interaction of the agents with human-controlled 
agents, and 
vi)  Explore integration with Terence Tan’s intelligent blue entities [20] 
to study the interactions between red and blue intelligent agents. 
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APPENDIX A:  RESULTS OF MEASUREMENTS AND 
STATISTICAL RESULTS 
The following table shows the results of the thirty runs for standard 
behavior. 
 






















 110.270799 2 11 3 2 0 16 
 210.716136 1 21 0 1 0 22 
 313.630137 3 17 0 2 0 19 
 411.662902 3 19 0 1 0 20 
 517.001678 2 13 0 5 0 18 
 610.302817 3 20 0 0 0 20 
 710.129052 2 28 0 9 0 37 
 814.785756 3 9 0 5 0 14 
 9 12.17068 2 23 0 9 0 32 
 1010.503485 1 9 0 2 0 11 
 1111.793807 3 4 0 2 0 6 
 1210.503485 2 21 0 4 0 25 
 1316.793807 1 9 0 2 0 11 
 1410.503485 1 9 0 2 0 11 
 1514.785756 2 18 0 2 0 20 
 1614.785756 3 6 0 0 0 6 
 1710.916609 0 17 1 2 0 20 
 1814.785756 3 14 0 4 0 18 
 19 12.17068 3 19 0 1 0 20 
 2010.143368 2 5 0 1 0 6 
 2114.006749 2 9 0 2 0 11 
 2214.785756 2 19 0 1 0 20 
 23 8.50604 2 18 0 2 0 20 
 2414.228626 3 4 0 0 0 4 
 2514.256365 2 15 0 3 0 18 
 2616.793807 3 10 0 2 0 12 
 2715.588526 2 18 0 1 0 19 
 2810.654575 2 18 0 0 0 18 
 2917.001678 3 13 0 0 0 13 
 3013.852014 2 19 0 3 0 22 
Sum   388.03008 65 435 4 70 0 509 
Mean 
  























Standard Deviation   2.4792126 0.7914776 6.112452 0.5713465 2.2641636 0 7.2895 
95% Confidence Interval 
 
0.8871585 0.2832214 2.1872727 0.2044499 0.8102056 0 0 
Variance   6.1464952 0.6264368 37.362069 0.3264368 5.1264368 0 53.1368 
 
The following table shows the results of the thirty runs for MAS behavior. 
 






















 111.141019 3 4 0 1 2 7
 29.8760498 2 5 1 6 1 13
 313.852014 3 10 0 13 2 25
 410.129052 4 6 0 4 4 14
 515.635929 3 5 0 1 0 6
 610.302817 3 11 1 6 3 21
 710.129052 2 11 3 16 8 38
 89.8760498 3 7 0 5 2 14
 914.234592 2 5 0 5 1 11
 1014.785756 1 8 4 2 3 17
 1113.394504 1 8 0 9 7 24
 12 12.17068 2 15 0 13 7 35
 1310.729634 1 5 0 3 1 9
 1411.141019 2 8 0 1 0 9
 1514.006749 4 8 0 9 4 21
 1614.006749 4 8 6 5 5 24
 1715.778072 2 10 0 8 3 21
 1816.625066 3 7 0 3 1 11
 1912.135078 3 9 0 9 9 27
 2010.143368 4 7 0 4 3 14
 219.8760498 3 4 0 1 1 6
 2213.080629 1 8 0 2 2 12
 2316.793807 2 7 0 2 1 10
 2416.625066 3 5 0 1 1 7
 2513.852014 3 6 0 5 3 14
 26 12.17068 3 15 0 12 11 38
 2715.588183 1 12 0 4 6 22
 2816.625066 2 7 0 6 1 14
 2912.754994 2 11 0 6 4 21























Sum   391.46648 74 242 17 165 102 526 
Mean 
  
13.048883 2.4666667 8.0666667 0.5666667 5.5 3.4 17.5333 
Standard Deviation   2.3483209 0.9371024 2.8998613 1.4064711 4.0407408 2.8235463 8.98556 
95% Confidence Interval 
 
0.8403204 0.3353316 1.037683 0.50329 1.445934 1.0103745 0 
Variance   5.5146109 0.8781609 8.4091954 1.9781609 16.327586 7.9724138 80.7402 
 
The follow pictures show the screen snapshots of the distribution, t-Test, 
and Wilcoxon/Kruskal-Wallis (Rank Sums) test of the operation time 
measurement. 
  
Figure 34 Distribution, t-Test, and Wilcoxon/Kruskal-Wallis (Rank Sums) Test of 
Operation Time 
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The following pictures show the screen snapshots of the distribution, t-
Test, and Wilcoxon/Kruskal-Wallis (Rank Sums) test of the total activity-count 
measurement. 
  
Figure 35 Distribution, t-Test, and Wilcoxon/Kruskal-Wallis (Rank Sums) Test of 
Total Activity Count 
The follow pictures show the screen snapshots of the distribution, t-Test, 
and Wilcoxon/Kruskal-Wallis (Rank Sums) test of the attack-activity-count 
measurement. 
  
Figure 36 Distribution, t-Test, and Wilcoxon/Kruskal-Wallis (Rank Sums) Test of 
Attack-Activity Count 
 69 
The follow pictures show the screen snapshots of the distribution, t-Test, 
and Wilcoxon/Kruskal-Wallis (Rank Sums) test of the hide-activity-count 
measurement. 
  
Figure 37 Distribution, t-Test, and Wilcoxon/Kruskal-Wallis (Rank Sums) Test of 
Hide-Activity Count 
The follow pictures show the screen snapshots of the distribution, t-Test, 
and Wilcoxon/Kruskal-Wallis (Rank Sums) test of the evade-activity-count 
measurement. 
  
Figure 38 Distribution, t-Test, and Wilcoxon/Kruskal-Wallis (Rank Sums) Test of 
Evade-Activity Count 
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The follow pictures show the screen snapshots of the distribution, t-Test, 
and Wilcoxon/Kruskal-Wallis (Rank Sums) test of the escape-activity-count 
measurement. 
  
Figure 39 Distribution, t-Test, and Wilcoxon/Kruskal-Wallis (Rank Sums) Test of 
Escape-Activity Count 
The follow pictures show the screen snapshots of the distribution, t-Test, 
and Wilcoxon/Kruskal-Wallis (Rank Sums) test of the successful-attack-count 
measurement. 
  
Figure 40 Distribution, t-Test, and Wilcoxon/Kruskal-Wallis (Rank Sums) Test of 
Successful-Attack Count 
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APPENDIX B:  CODE SNIPPETS 
//======================================================= 
// Snippets from PortCookieCutterMediator.java 
//======================================================= 
    /** 
     * Mediates between sensor and cover to enforce cover scenarios 
     * Use PortContact instead of Contact to enable access to source of contact 
     */ 
    public void doEnterRange(Sensor sensor, Mover target) { 
        if (this == SensorTargetMediatorFactory.getInstance().getMediatorFor( 
                sensor.getClass(), target.getClass())) { 
            if (sensor instanceof PortCoverSensor) { 
                Mover mover = sensor.getMover(); 
                if ((mover instanceof RadarCrossSection) && (target instanceof RadarCrossSection)) { 
                    double sensorRadarCrossSection = ((RadarCrossSection)mover).getRadarCrossSection(); 
                    double targetRadarCrossSection = ((RadarCrossSection)target).getRadarCrossSection(); 
                    if ((targetRadarCrossSection < sensorRadarCrossSection) || 
                        ((Math.abs(targetRadarCrossSection - sensorRadarCrossSection)  
                        < Double.MIN_VALUE) && !isCoveredBy(mover, target))) { 
                        // set covered target 
                        coveredTargets.add(target); 
                        covers.put(target, mover); 
                        notifySensorsTargetUndetected(target); 
                    } 
                } 
            } else { 
                if (!isCoveredTarget(target)) { 
                    Contact contact = contacts.get(target); 
                    if (contact == null) { 
                        contact = new PortContact(target); 
                        contacts.put(target, contact); 
                    } 
                    sensor.waitDelay(“Detection”, 0.0, contact); 
                } 
            } 
        } 
    } 
 
    /** 
     * Mediates between sensor and cover to enforce cover scenarios 
     * Create PortContact to ensure that a non-null contact is passed to event 
     */ 
    public void doExitRange(Sensor sensor, Mover target) { 
        if (this == SensorTargetMediatorFactory.getMediator( 
                sensor.getClass(), target.getClass())) { 
            if (sensor instanceof PortCoverSensor) { 
                Mover mover = sensor.getMover(); 
                if ((mover instanceof RadarCrossSection) && (target instanceof RadarCrossSection)) { 
                    double sensorRadarCrossSection = ((RadarCrossSection)mover).getRadarCrossSection(); 
                    double targetRadarCrossSection = ((RadarCrossSection)target).getRadarCrossSection(); 
                    if ((targetRadarCrossSection < sensorRadarCrossSection) || 
                        ((Math.abs(targetRadarCrossSection - sensorRadarCrossSection)  
                        < Double.MIN_VALUE) && isCoveredBy(target, mover))) { 
                        // uncover target 
                        coveredTargets.remove(target); 
                        // remove cover 
                        covers.remove(target); 
                        notifySensorsTargetDetected(target); 
                    } 
                } 
            } else { 
                if (!isCoveredTarget(target)) { 
                    Contact contact = contacts.get(target); 
                    if (contact == null) { 
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                        contact = new PortContact(target); 
                        contacts.put(target, contact); 
                    } 
                    sensor.waitDelay(“Undetection”, 0.0, contact); 
                } 
            } 
        } 
    } 
//======================================================= 





// Snippets from SmallBoatThreat.java 
//======================================================= 
    /** 
     * respond to broadcasts of threat detected 
     */ 
    public void doBroadcast(BroadcastMessage message) { 
        if (this.isLeave) { 
            return; 
        } 
             
        // if successful, stop activities 
        if ((message.getBroadcastMessageType().compareTo(BroadcastMessageType.SUCCESSFUL_ATTACK) == 0) || 
            (message.getBroadcastMessageType().compareTo(BroadcastMessageType.SUCCESSFUL_ESCAPE) == 0)) { 
            // set leaving to true 
            this.isLeave = true; 
            // stop activities 
            stopActivities(); 
            return; 
        } 
         
        // if caught, surrender 
        if (isCaught(message)) { 
            surrender((SimEntity)message.getParameters()[0]); 
            return; 
        } 
         
        // prevent deadlock in repeated activities 
        if (this.checkRepeatAction()) { 
            return; 
        } 
         
        // run behaviors 
        if (RunOaklandPort.getUseMAS()) { 
            runMASBehavior(message); 
        } else { 
            runStandardBehavior(message); 
        } 
    } 
 
    /** 
     * MAS behavior 
     */ 
    protected void runMASBehavior(BroadcastMessage message) { 
        BroadcastMessage decision = checkMASDecision(message); 
        if (decision.getBroadcastMessageType().equals(BroadcastMessageType.SURRENDER)) { 
            surrender((SimEntity)decision.getParameters()[0]); 
        } else if (decision.getBroadcastMessageType().equals(BroadcastMessageType.ATTACK)) { 
            attack(); 
        } else if (decision.getBroadcastMessageType().equals(BroadcastMessageType.HIDE)) { 
            hide((SimEntity)decision.getParameters()[0]); 
        } else if (decision.getBroadcastMessageType().equals(BroadcastMessageType.EVADE)) { 
            evade((SimEntity)decision.getParameters()[0]); 
        } else if (decision.getBroadcastMessageType().equals(BroadcastMessageType.ESCAPE)) { 
            escape((SimEntity)decision.getParameters()[0]); 
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        } 
    } 
 
    /** 
     * Standard behavior 
     */ 
    protected void runStandardBehavior(BroadcastMessage message) { 
        if (isChased()) { 
            SimEntity coverEntity = null; 
            if (canHitTargetFirst(message)) { 
                attack(); 
            } else if ((coverEntity = findNearestCover(message)) != null) { 
                hide(coverEntity); 
            } else if (canOutrun(message)) { 
                evade((SimEntity)message.getParameters()[0]); 
            } else { 
                escape((SimEntity)message.getParameters()[0]); 
            } 
        } else { 
            attack(); 
        } 
    } 
 
    // number of personality types 
    private int masNumberOfPersonalityTypes = 4; 
     
    // number of action types 
    private int masNumberOfActionTypes = 4; 
 
    // 0 = suicide personality 
    // 1 = tactical personality 
    // 2 = deceptive personality 
    // 3 = balanced personality 
    // {motivation for attack=reduce distance to attack target, 
    // motivation for tactical=increase distance from nearest blue entity, 
    // motivation for deception=reduce distance to nearest cover} 
    private double[][] masPersonality = new double[][] { 
        {1.0, 0.0, 0.0}, // suicide 
        {0.0, 1.0, 0.0}, // tactical 
        {0.0, 0.0, 1.0}, // deceptive 
        {0.3, 0.3, 0.3} // balanced 
    }; 
     
    // {attack, hide, evade, escape} 
    private double[][] masActionWeights = new double[][] { 
        {0.25, 0.25, 0.25, 0.25}, // suicide 
        {0.25, 0.25, 0.25, 0.25}, // tactical 
        {0.25, 0.25, 0.25, 0.25}, // deceptive 
        {0.25, 0.25, 0.25, 0.25} // balanced 
    }; 
     
    // history of happiness 
    private List<Double> masDecisionHistoryHappiness = new ArrayList<Double>(); 
     
    // history of decisions 
    private List<BroadcastMessage> masDecisionHistory = new ArrayList<BroadcastMessage>(); 
     
    // history of decision times 
    private List<Double> masDecisionHistoryTimes = new ArrayList<Double>(); 
     
    // history of personalities 
    private List<Integer> masDecisionHistoryPersonality = new ArrayList<Integer>(); 
         
    // history of distance to attack target 
    private List<Double> masDecisionHistoryDistanceToAttackTarget = new ArrayList<Double>(); 
 
    // history of distance to nearest blue entity 
    private List<Double> masDecisionHistoryDistanceToNearestBlueEntity = new ArrayList<Double>(); 
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    // history of distance to nearest cover 
    private List<Double> masDecisionHistoryDistanceToNearestCover = new ArrayList<Double>(); 
 
    /** 
     * Decisions can be to attack, hide, evade or escape. 
     * Decisions are encoded and returned as a broadcast message. 
     * Inputs to MAS include: 
     * Goals are  
     * i) attack target, ii) avoid being intercepted, iii) find cover 
     * Methods are 
     * i) Fixed personality weights, ii) Changing personality+action probabilities 
     * Happiness is based on 
     * i) proximity to attack target, ii) distance away from blue entity,  
     * iii) distance away from cover 
     * Actions are  
     * i) attack, ii) hide, iii) evade, iv) escape 
     * Conditions are  
     * i) whether cover is nearby ii) whether blue entity is nearby 
     * Personalities are  
     * i) suicide (favors reducing proxmity to attack target), 
     * ii) tactical (favors increasing distance away from blue entity) 
     * iii) deceptive (facors reducing distance to cover) 
     * iv) balanced (balance) 
     */ 
    public BroadcastMessage checkMASDecision(BroadcastMessage message) { 
         
        // get current decision time 
        double currentDecisionTime = Schedule.getSimTime(); 
         
        // get distance to attack target 
        Point2D location = this.getMover().getLocation(); 
        double distanceToAttackTarget =  
                location.distance(this.attackTarget.getLocation()); 
 
        // get distance to nearest blue entity 
        double distanceToNearestBlueEntity = this.maxRange; 
        BlueEntity nearestBlueEntity = null; 
        for (Entry<SimEntity, Boolean> entry : contacts.entrySet()) { 
            if (entry.getValue().booleanValue()) { // if known threat 
                if (entry.getKey() instanceof BlueEntity) { 
                    BlueEntity blueEntity = (BlueEntity)entry.getKey(); 
                    double newDistance = location.distance(blueEntity.getLocation()); 
                    if (newDistance < distanceToNearestBlueEntity) { 
                        distanceToNearestBlueEntity = newDistance; 
                        nearestBlueEntity = blueEntity; 
                    } 
                } 
            } 
        } 
 
        // get distance to nearest cover 
        double distanceToNearestCover = this.maxRange; 
        Map<Moveable, Double> nearestEntities =  
                port.findNearestEntities(getMover(), this.maxRange); 
        Moveable nearestEntity = null; 
        for (Entry<Moveable, Double> entry : nearestEntities.entrySet()) { 
            Moveable moveable = entry.getKey(); 
            if (moveable == this) { // avoid choosing itself 
                continue; 
            } 
            double newDistance =  location.distance(moveable.getLocation()); 
            if (newDistance < distanceToNearestCover) { 
                distanceToNearestCover = newDistance; 
                nearestEntity = moveable; 
            } 
        } 
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        // get last decision 
        BroadcastMessage lastDecision = null; 
        if (!this.getMasDecisionHistory().isEmpty()) { 
            lastDecision = getMasDecisionHistory().get(getMasDecisionHistory().size() - 1); 
        } 
         
        // get last decision time 
        double lastDecisionTime = currentDecisionTime; 
        if (!this.getMasDecisionHistoryTimes().isEmpty()) { 
            lastDecisionTime =  
                    getMasDecisionHistoryTimes().get( 
                    getMasDecisionHistoryTimes().size() - 1).doubleValue(); 
        } 
         
        // get last distance to attack target 
        double lastDistanceToAttackTarget = Double.MAX_VALUE; 
        if (!this.getMasDecisionHistoryDistanceToAttackTarget().isEmpty()) { 
            lastDistanceToAttackTarget =  
                    getMasDecisionHistoryDistanceToAttackTarget().get( 
                    getMasDecisionHistoryDistanceToAttackTarget().size() - 1).doubleValue(); 
        } 
         
        // get last distance to nearest blue entity 
        double lastDistanceToNearestBlueEntity = Double.MAX_VALUE; 
        if (!this.getMasDecisionHistoryDistanceToNearestBlueEntity().isEmpty()) { 
            lastDistanceToNearestBlueEntity =  
                    getMasDecisionHistoryDistanceToNearestBlueEntity().get( 
                    getMasDecisionHistoryDistanceToNearestBlueEntity().size() - 1).doubleValue(); 
        } 
         
        // get last distance to nearest cover 
        double lastDistanceToNearestCover = Double.MAX_VALUE; 
        if (!this.getMasDecisionHistoryDistanceToNearestCover().isEmpty()) { 
            lastDistanceToNearestCover =  
                    getMasDecisionHistoryDistanceToNearestCover().get( 
                    getMasDecisionHistoryDistanceToNearestCover().size() - 1).doubleValue(); 
        } 
         
        // get last personality 
        int lastPersonalityType = 0; 
        if (!this.getMasDecisionHistoryPersonality().isEmpty()) { 
            lastPersonalityType =  
                    getMasDecisionHistoryPersonality().get( 
                    getMasDecisionHistoryPersonality().size() - 1).intValue(); 
        } 
         
        // get last last decision happiness 
        double lastLastDecisionHappiness = 0.0; 
        if (!this.getMasDecisionHistoryHappiness().isEmpty()) { 
            lastLastDecisionHappiness =  
                    getMasDecisionHistoryHappiness().get( 
                    getMasDecisionHistoryHappiness().size() - 1).doubleValue(); 
        } 
         
        // compute last decision happiness 
        double maxAttackDistance = startingLocation.distance(attackTarget.getLocation()); 
        double normChangeInAttackDistance =  
                ((lastDistanceToAttackTarget == Double.MAX_VALUE) ? 0 :  
                    (lastDistanceToAttackTarget - distanceToAttackTarget)) / maxAttackDistance; 
        double normChangeInDistanceToNearestBlueEntity =  
                ((lastDistanceToNearestBlueEntity == Double.MAX_VALUE) ? 0 :  
                    (distanceToNearestBlueEntity - lastDistanceToNearestBlueEntity)) / this.maxRange; 
        double normChangeInDistanceToNearestCover =  
                ((lastDistanceToNearestCover == Double.MAX_VALUE) ? 0 :  
                    (lastDistanceToNearestCover - distanceToNearestCover)) / this.maxRange; 
        double lastDecisionHappiness =  
                (normChangeInAttackDistance * getMasPersonality()[lastPersonalityType][0] + 
                normChangeInDistanceToNearestBlueEntity * getMasPersonality()[lastPersonalityType][1] + 
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                normChangeInDistanceToNearestCover * getMasPersonality()[lastPersonalityType][2]) / 3; 
         
        // update history for happiness 
        if (lastDecision != null) { // if a decision has been made previously 
            // update the decision happiness 
            this.getMasDecisionHistoryHappiness().add(new Double(lastDecisionHappiness)); 
 
            // update the action weights 
            int lastActionType = this.getActionType(lastDecision.getBroadcastMessageType()); 
            for (int i = 0; i < this.getMasNumberOfActionTypes(); i++) { 
                if (i == lastActionType) { 
                    // give half of the happiness to the last action type, and normalize 
                    this.getMasActionWeights()[lastPersonalityType][i] =  
                            (this.getMasActionWeights()[lastPersonalityType][i] + 
                            (0.5 * lastDecisionHappiness)) / (1.0 + lastDecisionHappiness); 
                } else { 
                    // distribute the remaining happiness among the rest of the action types, and normalize 
                    this.getMasActionWeights()[lastPersonalityType][i] =  
                            (this.getMasActionWeights()[lastPersonalityType][i] + 
                            (0.5 * lastDecisionHappiness / (this.getMasNumberOfActionTypes() - 1))) 
                            / (1.0 + lastDecisionHappiness); 
                } 
            } 
        } 
 
        // choose next personality that is likely to give highest happiness 
        int personality = 0; 
        double decisionHappiness =  
                normChangeInAttackDistance * getMasPersonality()[0][0] + 
                normChangeInDistanceToNearestBlueEntity * getMasPersonality()[0][1] + 
                normChangeInDistanceToNearestCover * getMasPersonality()[0][2]; 
        for (int i = 1; i < getMasNumberOfPersonalityTypes(); i++) { 
            double newDecisionHappiness =  
                normChangeInAttackDistance * getMasPersonality()[i][0] + 
                normChangeInDistanceToNearestBlueEntity * getMasPersonality()[i][1] + 
                normChangeInDistanceToNearestCover * getMasPersonality()[i][2]; 
            if (newDecisionHappiness > decisionHappiness) { 
                decisionHappiness = newDecisionHappiness; 
                personality = i; 
            } 
        } 
         
        // choose next action that is likely to give highest happiness 
        double randomValue = Math.random(); 
        double cumulativeProbability = 0.0; 
        int actionType = 0; 
        SimEntity coverEntity = null; 
        for (int i = 0; i < this.getMasNumberOfActionTypes(); i++) { 
            cumulativeProbability += this.getMasActionWeights()[personality][i]; 
            if (randomValue < cumulativeProbability) { 
                if (i == 1) { // check condition if cover nearby 
                    if (nearestEntity != null) { 
                        double nearestDistance = Double.MAX_VALUE; 
                        for (Entry<Moveable, Double> entry : nearestEntities.entrySet()) { 
                            Moveable moveable = entry.getKey(); 
                            if (moveable == this) { // avoid choosing itself 
                                continue; 
                            } 
                            // if cover moving in direction of attack target and nearest 
                            double newDistance =  location.distance(moveable.getLocation()); 
                            if (Math2D2.isHeadingTowardsTarget(moveable.getLocation(), moveable.getVelocity(), 
                                    attackTarget.getLocation(), attackTarget.getVelocity(), Math.PI / 4) && 
                                    (newDistance < nearestDistance) && (moveable instanceof SimEntity)) { 
                                // choose cover 
                                nearestDistance = newDistance; 
                                coverEntity = (SimEntity)moveable; 
                            } 
                        } 
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                        if (coverEntity != null) { 
                            actionType = i; 
                            break; 
                        } 
                    } 
                } else if ((i == 2) || (i == 3)) { // check condition if blue entity nearby 
                    if (nearestBlueEntity != null) { 
                        actionType = i; 
                        break; 
                    } 
                } else { 
                    actionType = i; 
                    break; 
                } 
            } 
        } 
         
        // create decision 
        BroadcastMessage decision = null; 
        switch (actionType) { 
            case 0: // attack 
            default: 
                decision = new BroadcastMessage(this, null, BroadcastMessageType.ATTACK, attackTarget); 
                break; 
            case 1: // hide 
                decision = new BroadcastMessage(this, null, BroadcastMessageType.HIDE, coverEntity); 
                break; 
            case 2: // evade 
                decision = new BroadcastMessage(this, null, BroadcastMessageType.EVADE, nearestBlueEntity); 
                break; 
            case 3: // escape 
                decision = new BroadcastMessage(this, null, BroadcastMessageType.ESCAPE, nearestBlueEntity); 
                break; 
        } 
         
        // update history for decision 
        getMasDecisionHistory().add(decision); 
         
        // update history for decision time 
        getMasDecisionHistoryTimes().add(new Double(currentDecisionTime)); 
         
        // update history for personality 
        this.getMasDecisionHistoryPersonality().add(new Integer(personality)); 
 
        // update history for distance to attack target 
        this.getMasDecisionHistoryDistanceToAttackTarget().add(new Double(distanceToAttackTarget)); 
     
        // update history for distance to nearest blue entity 
        this.getMasDecisionHistoryDistanceToNearestBlueEntity().add(new Double(distanceToNearestBlueEntity)); 
         
        // update history for distance to nearest cover 
        this.getMasDecisionHistoryDistanceToNearestCover().add(new Double(distanceToNearestCover)); 
                 
        return decision; 
    }     
//======================================================= 
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